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Stormo: The Intent of the Law in Waivers: For the Persona or the "Other"

THE INTENT OF THE LAW IN WAIVERS:
FOR THE PERSONA OR THE "OTHER"
ENTITY?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The way one uses his or her persona or likeness is important,
especially because as technology expands and the use of it
intensifies, there are more ways to manipulate the law in favor of
the infringer. When a persona signs a license or agreement
granting and excluding certain rights to a producer, manager, or
some other entity, what rights does this waive today as opposed to
twenty years ago when it was signed? What are the intended
consequences of the real-life operation of law?
In this Comment, Part I looks at how copyright and contract law
currently strives to evaluate license agreements and analyzes each
part of the agreement. Part II analyzes Brown v. Twentieth
Century Fox' looking at basic contract law based on the overview
given in Part I. Part Ill shows the impact of right of publicity, the
First Amendment, and contract law as well as identifies a solution
to problems of the law. The article concludes that there should be
a stronger form of protection for personas that have waived
general rights prior to knowledge of the burgeoning technology.
At the same time, the courts should find a reasonable standard
analysis to ascertain that the balance of waived rights is fair to
both the persona and the entity to whom the persona has licensed
exclusive rights.
II. CASE LAW OVERVIEW - THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT
APPROACH IN ANALYZING LICENSING AGREEMENTS

The author of an original work may obtain a copyright in her
work as long as certain statutory criteria are met. 2 Often, it is
' 799 F. Supp. 166, 170 (1992).
2 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
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beneficial to this copyright owner to assign or license some of the
rights associated with holding a copyright.3 When a copyright
holder transfers some or all of the rights in a copyrighted work, the
transferee can use the rights obtained to hold others liable for
infringing the copyrighted work.4 Although copyright owners
transfer their rights frequently, issues still remain regarding the
scope of copyright licenses. What may a transferee do with the
work? To what extent can the transferee assume ownership?
Answering these questions is difficult despite having the terms in a
contract because consistent and swift changes in technology have
changed the abilities and behaviors of what can be and is being
done with copyrighted works. To add to this frustration, no
controlling law has addressed what a copyright holder may do with
the work in the event that the licensing agreement does not address
a new mode or form of presentation of the work. Some courts
address the situation with basic contract law while other courts
apply copyright law.
The right of publicity is statutory law instated to protect a
5
person's name or likeness from unauthorized public exposure.
The right of publicity is enforced to protect against unauthorized
attempts to commercially, through advertisement or on
merchandise, utilize another's time investment in a person's
individual characteristics: name, likeness, and other recognizable
attributes.6 When celebrities use these things in a unique style and
famous nature, they tend to be considered one's persona.7 The
3 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994). The exclusive rights held in conjunction with the
copyright are explained in the Copyright Act and include the rights to do and to
authorize reproduction of the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted work, distribute copies of the work, and to perform or
display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
4 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1994). The owner of any particular exclusive right is
entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded
to the copyright owner.
5 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASE AND MATERIALS
ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 519 (1996). 17 U.S.C. § 102, et
al. (1994).
6rd.
7 Jeffrey Malkan, Stolen Photographs:Personality,Publicity,and Privacy, 75

TEx. L. REv. 779 (1997).
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right of publicity is distinguished from the right of privacy, which
presumes that there is something deeper to a person's identity than
that which is socially defined. 8 The right of privacy protects the
person from "unwanted public exposure." 9 The personality is
something to be both protected and shown off - the persona of a
celebrity is something unique and to be shown off, but often it
"deflects attention from the plaintiff s essential self."10
The court recognizes that it needs to be mindful of protecting
personas because overprotecting could limit the amount of speech
and debate in society; rights protected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment offers the freedom of speech.11 By granting
a persona too many rights to her likeness or name, society is
restrained in the way it can express ideas or opinions in regard to
that persona. However, persona protection is there to guard
reputation, prevent over-exposure, protect against free-riding and
When a party makes an
to prevent consumer confusion.
unauthorized use of the name and likeness of another party, a
claim for misappropriation may arise.12 In other words, the tort of
of name or likeness protects an individual's
misappropriation
13
persona.
It is important to protect personas because, as Chief Justice Bird
Pictures,14
of California wrote in her dissent in Lugosi v. Universal
"[T]he unauthorized use disrupts the individual's effort to control
8

id.

9Id.

1°Id.

11U.S. CONST.

amend. I.
17 U.S.C. §301(a) (1994). All legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
are
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ...
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such
right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of
any State.
12

13Brown

v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657 (2000). The tort for misappropriation of
name or likeness protects the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his
own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so far
as the use may be of benefit to him or to others. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652C (1977).
14603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
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his public image, and may substantially alter that image."'15 In
addition, the persona has commercial value. 1 6 It has this value
because the persona cannot be seen through by the audience; the
persona is as it chooses to portray itself to the world. 17 In building
up a persona, celebrities or others often spend a great deal of time,
labor, and money.' 8 To allow this unauthorized use by others is to
allow them to take the investment of the persona and dissolve or
completely extinguish it through "overexposure and careless
19
exploitation."'
A problem arises in protecting the celebrity persona because it
"is both tangible and intangible at the same time.' '20 It is not as
tangible as the photographs that are taken of the celebrity, but
more tangible than the mere idea of personality. 2 ' The best way to
protect the persona is with the law. This can be done through state
right of publicity laws, state misappropriation laws, and
recognizing First Amendment rights.
First Amendment rights need to be weighed on behalf of all
parties involved in an agreement. The party who is having rights
licensed to it has First Amendment rights, as does the party who is
waiving those rights. The First Amendment is the right of free
speech 22 and is in the Constitution to encourage new ideas and
opinions. The right to freedom of speech can weigh in favor and
in opposition to the individual party. The allegedly infiinging
party will often argue its First Amendment rights when trying to
defend a use that the plaintiff feels is protected. The First
Amendment strongly protects political, informational, and
entertainment works.2 3 However, the First Amendment does not
15.d

16 Malkan, supra note 7, at 835.
1d"

17

18

Malkan, supra note 7, at 829.

'9 Id. at 830.
20 Id. at 832.
21

Id. at 832.

22 U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

23 Erika Paulsrude, Not the LastDance:Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp.

Proves CaliforniaRight of PublicityStatutes and the FirstAmendment Can CoExist, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. J. 395, 413 (1998).
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protect exploitative commercial speech of one's name and likeness
because it does not promote new ideas and opinions.24 For
example, Julia Roberts could enjoin the use of her photograph in a
liquor advertisement without establishing that the association with
liquor harms her image. In this respect, the First Amendment
protects the persona and not the licensee. Additionally, "the First
Amendment does not protect knowingly false speech., 25 To
recover under this argument, though, the plaintiff would need to
show actual malice on the defendant's part.26
There are a number of ways to promote a persona through
unauthorized uses. One of the easiest examples people can relate
to is the unauthorized uses of Princess Diana's name and likeness
after her death.27 After Diana's death, many parties produced
merchandise commemorative of Diana and also produced
sculptures and dolls with Diana's likeness without the permission
The unauthorized uses by these product
of her Estate.28
merchandisers were alleged to have been "(1) false designation of
origin and false endorsement under the Lanham Act; (2) federal
trademark dilution in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1125(c); (3)
infringement of California's statutory right of publicity; (4) false
advertising under the Lanham Act; and (5) unfair competition and
false and misleading advertising in violation of California
Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500. "29 While
there are many ways to punish unauthorized uses, often the
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).
This definition was provided by the district court. However, the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the perspective of the District Court's notion of
"commercial speech" and thereby also disagreed with parts of the District
Court's opinion on the case.
2 Id.
26 1d.at 1186.
27
24 Hoffmnanv.

See Lord Simon Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (1998).

id.
Id.at 1022. The defendants in this case did not have permission to produce,
promote or sell the commemorative merchandise of Diana. Further, the
defendants did not have permission to make the items with Diana's likeness.
Diana's Estate pressed the five issues supra alleging that defendants used the
advertising to "improperly benefit from the goodwill associated with Princess
Diana's identity." Id.
29

29
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30
plaintiff will seek injunctive relief and/or damages.

A. How CourtsDetermine What Rights Are Waived

1. Language of the ContractandLicense Agreements
Courts typically look to the language of the contract in
determining exactly what rights a persona may have waived upon
contract signing and how that affects the persona in today's
technology. 31 Since there is not a definitive statute32 to follow
when trying to overcome discrepancies in copyright licenses, it is
necessary to pay attention to the express language of the license
and see how it compares to Copyright Law under the 1976
Copyright Act.33 Courts consider whether the language is broad,34
they look at the intent of the parties,35 industry practice,36 the right
of publicity, 37 the rights of the parties, 38 the nature of technology
and whether this type of technology was foreseeable. 39 Sometimes
courts will consider the sophistication of the parties while keeping
in mind who the drafting party was.40
A license is drafted to assign rights from one party to another.
30

Id. at 1044.

31 Stacey M. Byrnes, CopyrightLicenses, New Technology and Default Rules:

ConvergingMedia, Diverging Courts? 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 243 (2000).
The Copyright Act provides strong guidelines for licenses, but parties

32

typically taper their agreements in line to what they intend or hope to achieve
through the agreement. No statute can define a party's intent, which is why
individual agreements are drawn up and why it is necessary to look at
contractual language.
33 Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 855 (1988).
34
Rooney v. Columbia Pictures, 538 F. Supp. 211,223 (1982). "Under
California law, the determination of whether a written contract is ambiguous is a
question of law that must be decided by the court."
35
Bymes, supra note 31, at 246.
36

id.

37 Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox, 799 F. Supp. 166 (1992).
38
39
40

Byrnes, supra note 31, at 253.

Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
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The language of the contract is typically drafted in an effort to
address all assignments and exclusions involved in the copyrighted
work to the licensee. 41 The privileges conveyed in a license
agreement are particularly important in the waiving of rights issue.
"There is a difference between the parties' failure to address an
existing use, and a use not existing at the time the agreement is
made but one the licensee undertakes to exercise control over
through exploitation. '42 The difference is in how the court should
rule - in favor of the licensee because of the licensor's oversight of
an already existing piece of technology such as a television in
1975, or in favor of the licensor because the VCR was not existent
at the time of the agreement and the licensee intends to exercise
control over this previously non-existing use.
Next, the court analyzes the extrinsic and plain meaning of the
contractual language. 43 Under some state laws, courts take a
"permissive approach to extrinsic evidence in contract
interpretation." 44 The extrinsic evidence could move the
interpretation of the contractual language forward for the court.
However, "if the extrinsic evidence advances an interpretation to
which the contract is not reasonably susceptible, the extrinsic
evidence is not admissible.' ' 45 This means that extrinsic evidence
is not the only thing that can help interpret the language of the
contract. When the language is too broad, the court will typically
look to the intent of the parties.
2. Intent of Parties
What the parties intended of the contract is particularly key
for the court to look at. The court, while reading the contractual
41 Joanne

Benoit Nakos, An Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the

Rights Conveyed by CopyrightLicense Agreements, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 433, 435
(1995).
42 Id.

43 Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (2000).
44 Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 799 F. Supp. 166, 170

(1992).
4Id.
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language, needs to concentrate on what the parties intended to
convey to and receive from each other. The court pays attention to
the intent by looking at the language - if the language is very
broad or sweeping, the court may not be convinced that the intent
was truly there. However, if the language is more specific, it
indicates to the court that there was thought in the phraseology,
and therefore most likely an intent to convey or not convey a given
right.46 The court is also willing to look at extrinsic evidence
when evaluating the parties' intent.47 However, the court needs to
be convinced that the extrinsic evidence promotes an interpretation
to which the contract is reasonably susceptible. Otherwise, the
evidence is inadmissible.48 For example, a party's offer of extrinsic
evidence indicating that no rights to use a photograph without
permission were conveyed beyond the first use will be
inadmissible if the contract reads, "[y]ou hereby grant to Producer
the sole and exclusive right to photograph or otherwise
reproduce.. .and perpetually and throughout the world
exhibit...."49 This is because the court will deem the contract not
reasonably susceptible to such an interpretation.
3. Right of Publicity
Courts will also look at a person's right of publicity to
determine their contractual rights. It is generally accepted that
upon entry into the public eye by virtue of his or her creative work,
the performer subsequently relinquishes all rights that would
otherwise protect him or her.50 A performer's persona-her body,
voice and face-defines her value in the market place.5 ' Over
46 Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox, 799 F. Supp. 166, 170 (1992). Here, the

court decided that because the Agreement expressly permitted "the reproduction
and license to reproduce a 'portion' of the performance", it was indicative of the
Parties anticipating later use of the performance as parts of bigger projects. Id.

"Id.
48

id.

49
Id. at 169.
50Richard Masur,

The Right of Publicityfrom the Performer'sPointof View, 10
DEPAUL-LCA . ART & ENT. L. 253, 253 (2000).
5

Id.at 254.
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twenty state jurisdictions recognize some form
of right of
52
statute.
or
law
common
publicity, either through
To prevail in a right of publicity suit, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the defendant misappropriated the plaintiffs name or likeness
for the value associated with it and not in an incidental manner or
for a newsworthy purpose; (2) the plaintiff can be identified from
and (3) the defendant derived some advantage or
the publication;
53
benefit.
The nature of the technology at issue and whether or not this
technology was a foreseeable use are generally considered in a
right of publicity suit as well. 54 Some courts decide that the
language of the contract encompasses new forms of media despite
the distinct differences and the lack of foreseeing the medium.55
Meanwhile, other courts find copyright terms do not include new
uses and focus on the technological distinctions between the form
of media identified in the contract and the new media.56 Courts
have come to different conclusions regarding the foreseeability of
the same technology, such as television and videotapes.5 7 The
Cohen58 court found that "though videocassettes may be exhibited
by using a television monitor, it does not follow that, for copyright
purposes, playing videocassettes constitutes 'exhibition by
television' as is written in the contract language., 59 However, in
Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox,60 the contractual language was
held to be broad enough to be fairly read to include release on
52

Id. at 255.
Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657-658 (2000).
54 Byrnes, supra note 31, at 247.
55 Chambers, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 198. (Members of musical groups made
recordings in the 1950's and '60's for defendant in the form of vinyl records.
Defendant made digital recordings to put on intemet and plaintiff brought action
under copyright law. Court decided the contractual language included all
recordings, in favor of defendant.)
56 Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851. (Whether a license conferring the right to exhibit
a
film "by means of television" includes the right to distribute videocassettes of
the film. The court held that it did not.)
57 Id. at 853-854.
53

5

Id. at 851.
Id. at 853.
60 Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox, 799 F. Supp. 166, 171-172 (1992).
59
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their non-existence at the time the
videocassettes despite
61
made.
was
agreement
Courts rely on future technology clauses, such as "by any means
now known or hereafter developed," because they often show the
intent of the parties while entering into the agreement. 62 Courts
have also looked at actors' and performers' agreements without
future technology clauses and decided that they were written
63
broadly enough to encompass television and movie distribution.
Brown is a good example of this.64 The court in Brown reviewed
the contractual language, determining that the writing was
developed sufficiently to distinguish the parties' intents despite the
lack of a future technology clause.
IL. BROWN V. TWENTIETH CENTURY Fox 65

In Brown, the plaintiff, an entertainer, sued the defendant movie
distributor, Twentieth Century Fox, ("Fox"), after Fox used part of
well-known singer and songwriter James Brown's television
The defendants are the
performance in its movie.66
owners/distributors of the successful motion picture "The
Commitments," which was released in 1991.67 The film is about a
group of Irish men and women that form a soul music band. 68 The
music band's leader does his best to instruct the music group on
what it takes to be successful soul music performers. 69 n doing
this, the leader shows the group a videotape of Brown's
This
performance of the song "Please, Please, Please." 70
performance comes from Brown's appearance on the TAMI show
61
1d. at
62

171.
Bymes, supra note 31, at 248.
63 See Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 166.
64 799 F. Supp. 166 (1992).
65
Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox, 799 F. Supp. 166 (1992).
66
Id.at 168.
67

id.

63
69

d.
Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 168.
70
id.
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in 1965.71 Seven separate cuts of the performance are shown in
"The Commitments," totaling 27 seconds of background and entire
screen shots.72 The plaintiff's name is not mentioned during the
brief scene, but is mentioned later in the film when the leader
urges the band members to tune into the great soul performers,
including Brown by saying: "I want you on a strict diet of soul.
James Brown for the growls.... ,73 "In addition, the soundtrack
from the clip, without the accompanying video, is played as
background for a total of one minute twenty-two74 seconds, although
during much of this time it is nearly inaudible."
On October 22, 1964, before rehearsal for the TAMI Show
performance, Brown "entered into a letter agreement with the
producer of the TAME Show."75 "This agreement granted 'sole
and exclusive' rights to the producer to ...
use and display, and to
license or permit others to use and display, your name and likeness
for advertising of publicizing the Performance in conjunction with
the Theatrofilm provided, however, ... that Producer shall not
have the right to utilize your name, voice 76or likeness in connection
with any so-called 'commercial tie-ups.'
"In December 1984, the Producer transferred all of its interests,
including its rights in plaintiffs TAMI Show performance, to
Screen Entertainment." 77 Screen Entertainment subsequently
granted to "dick clark" teleshows, inc. a limited transfer of the
copyright for movie theater release. 78 After a series of transfers,
defendant, Beacon Communications acquired the right to use "no
more than 2 minutes of the song 'Please, Please, Please' by James
Brown from the TAMI Show" 79 for all "theatrical, non-theatrical,
videocassette and videodisc"8 0 uses throughout the world.8
721d.
73id.
74
7 5 Brown, 799

F. Supp. at 168.

Id.

76

Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 169.

77 id.
78 id.
79 id.
80

Id.
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Beacon also obtained the television rights to the TAMI Show from
"dick clark" media archives as well as the right to use the musical
composition and lyrics of the song "Please, Please, Please" from
the entities to whom Brown had transferred the copyright in
1956.82
"Brown argued that the 1964 letter Agreement was ambiguous
with regard to whether the grant of rights included the right to use
83
his performance in films, film promotions and videocassettes."
Brown further argued that the intent of the parties was consistent
with his narrow interpretation of the contractual language. 84 The
court held that as a matter of law the contractual language for
transfer was broad in part, but also specific in part,85 thereby
all other uses not specifically prohibited are to the
indicating
86
grantee.
Paragraph 4(A), The Grant of Rights, of the agreement reads:
A. You hereby grant to Producer the sole and
exclusive right to photograph or otherwise
reproduce in connection with the Theatrofilm87 all
or any part of your acts, poses, plays and
appearances of every kind and nature made or done
by you in connection with the Performances and/or
your services hereunder; and all instrumental,
musical or other sound effects produced by you in
connection with the Performances and/or your
81

Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 169.
id.
83 id.
84
Id.at 170.
82

85 The drafter of this contract was very specific in section 4(B) in reference to a
not allowing "commercial tie-ups," yet was not specific in section 4(A), where it
"sweeping language." Id. at 171.
8used
6
Id.
87 In the contract, see supra note 4, which states, "The term "Theatroflim" was
introduced and defined in a prior portion of the latter agreement as follows: This
letter, when accepted by you, will confirm your employment by the undersigned

(the "Producer") to render your musical performing services in connection with
the production of a Theatroflim photoplay of a teenage music show (the
"Theatrofilm").
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services hereunder; to reproduce, re-record and
transmit the same in connection with the
Theatrofilm in conjunction with such acts, poses,
plays and appearances, and perpetually and
throughout the world to exhibit, transmit,
reproduce, distribute, broadcast and exploit, and
license or permit others to exhibit, transmit,
reproduce, distribute, broadcast and exploit, any or
all of such photographs, reproductions and
recordations in connection with all or any portion of
the Theatrofilm, or the advertising or exploitation
thereof, in and by all media and means whatsoever.
B. Producer shall have the right throughout the
world to use and display, and to license or permit
others to use and display, your name and likeness
for advertising of publicizing the Performance in
conjunction with the Theatrofilm provided,
however, that Producer shall not have the right to
utilize your name, voice or likeness in connection
with any so-called "commercial tie-ups." Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, Producer
shall have the right to use your name and likeness
with the
in the Theatrofilm and issued in connection
88
thereof.
exploitation
and
advertising
Brown next argued "that the grant of rights in paragraph 4(A) of
the agreement cannot be read to encompass the right to the
videocassette market, since it was not specified nor even in
existence at the time of the 1964 Agreement., 89 The court
recognized that in this case there is no contractual language
limiting the use of the performance to a specific medium, but
would have accepted the argument had the contractual language
" Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 169.
89
Id.at 171.
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been in the Agreement. 90
Brown continued by arguing that the language in the transfers to
Beacon obliged it to secure Brown's consent to use of the clip in
the film. 91 The court found that this consent was neither required
nor necessary based on the provision.92 The provision only
"obliges
Beacon to secure all required rights and pay all necessary
3
fees."

9

Subsequently, Brown argued that the defendant's use of his
name, likeness and persona violated his "right of publicity. '94 The
court, again, held for the defendant, explaining that because
Beacon had lawfully acquired the right to use the TAMI Show
performance, the alleged violation of the right of publicity cannot
be based on their use of that performance. 95 Putting the
performance aside, the only use of Brown's "persona" was a single
mention of his name along with the names of other entertainers as
an exemplar soul performer whom the band members should
study. 96 The court did not find that this was the type of
commercial appropriation that has been previously recognized as
Even though the
constituting a right-of-publicity claim. 97
defendants used the TAMI Show clip in its advertisements and
promotional trailers, since the defendants had a licensed right to
use the clip, it did not constitute a right-of-publicity claim. 98 The
plaintiff gave no other allegation that Brown's name or any aspect
of his persona except his appearance in the TAMI Show clip was
used by defendants to promote the product. 99
In summary, the defendant sought summary judgment pursuant
90 Id.
91

Id. at 172.
92id.
93
Brown,
94

id.

799 F. Supp. at 172.

95 Id.
96 id.
97 id.

9'

Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 172. A typical commercial appropriation claim

includes advertising and merchandising. Restatement (Third) of Unfair

Competition § 47 (1995).
99

Id. at 172.
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to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0 0 The court
granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that Brown
had granted Fox's predecessor-in-interest rights to use Brown's
image except for commercial endorsements 0 1 ; Brown's
interpretation of agreement - that Fox's predecessor could
rebroadcast the television show on which Brown appeared and
could use that performance to advertise the show, but could not
reproduce or license the reproduction of Brown's performance
itself - was untenable, given the language of the licensing
agreement.' 0 2 The prohibition on commercial endorsements did
as
not apply because Fox exhibited Brown's performance
0 3
characters.
movie's
its
by
emulated
something that should be

IV. ANALYSIS
In his complaint, plaintiff Brown alleged violations of the
Copyright Act, the Lanham Act, and several related common law
causes of action including unfair competition and violation of the
right of publicity. 10 4 Beginning with the right of publicity, the
reader can surmise that James Brown has established his persona
in the music industry. That established, one can proceed by
evaluating the contractual agreement, supra, between Brown and
the TAMI Show producer.
The court looked at the rights that Brown waived in his
Agreement with the Producer and determined that Brown had
granted interest in his rights to use Brown's image except for
Brown's interpretation of the
commercial endorsements.
agreement, however, was that Fox's predecessor could rebroadcast
the television show on which Brown appeared and could use that
performance to advertise the show, but could not reproduce or
license the reproduction of Brown's performance itself. The court
definitely focused on the expressed contractual language in
0
'

Id. at 168. See FED. R. C. P. 56(c).

101 Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 173.
102 id.
103

Id. On appeal, the court's decision was affirmed without opinion in 1994.

'04Id. at 168.
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making its determination. Focus on such language is a trend that
can be found in other districts as well. For example, in the
Southern District of New York, a court found in fifteen different
contracts with various film producers, that the plaintiff Mickey
Rooney had waived his rights for the numerous films he had acted
in by signing the contractual agreement allowing the various
producers to exploit the films in the ways that Rooney was
contesting. 05 The contractual language in Brown, just as in
Rooney, was broad enough for the court to determine that the
plaintiff had waived his right to the updated media form and had
"consciously" signed away his right to dispute this. To the court,
in both cases, the language of the contract was clear and the
defendant had won. Terms such as "the artist expressly gives and
grants to the producer..." 1 06 indicate that rights are being conveyed
to the producer. The contract requires an exclusionary clause for
those rights that the copyright holder/persona does not wish to
assign. Otherwise, the contractual language needs to be broad in
its entirety so that the court can determine overbreadth and allow
the plaintiff to maintain his rights.
Looking at the language of the contract, one can distinguish how
this will affect a persona in today's technology. In situations such
as the above mentioned, the persona unquestionably (to the court)
licensed rights to the use of his image in some capacities and he no
longer had control over the use. The question is whether the
person foresaw the new medium that was used when signing the
Agreement. The question became an issue in these cases due to
new technology. There were no "future technology clauses" per se
written in either of the above cases, but the court managed to apply
the general language to the benefit of the defendant.
The court looked at the contractual language in addressing the
intent of the parties when forming the Agreement. Brown argued
that his narrow interpretation of the contractual language was
consistent with the parties' intent.107 In California, the courts are

105
1
06Brown,

Rooney, 538 F. Supp. 211.
799 F. Supp. 170.
107
Id.at 170.
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10 8
willing to look at extrinsic evidence in interpreting a contract.
This court did not find the extrinsic evidence offered by Brown to
"109
be "reasonably susceptible to the interpretation suggested ....
practice"
"industry
Brown introduced information in regard to
which illustrated his perspective that the industry practice is to get
the consent of both the performer and the copyright holder when
using "clips.""' 0 Unfortunately for Brown, because the language
of the Agreement was so broad, it is difficult for the court to find
exacting evidence that the intent of the parties was in-fact to
follow "industry practice."" 1
The court in Brown did not find that Brown's right of publicity
had been interfered with.!1 2 Brown had argued that the clause
regarding "commercial tie-ups" had been written in to prevent his
name and likeness from being used in the way that it had been in
this movie.' 13 The court, however, recognized no true definition to
the term "commercial tie-ups" and could only infer based on
another comment from Brown that it was to be applied to
commercial endorsements for such things as "tobacco, cigarettes,
pornography or other unauthorized uses."' 1 4 The court could not
understand how defendant's use of the TAMI Show performance
violated Brown's right of publicity, particularly since the
defendant had licensed rights to use the performance." 5 The only
right of publicity violation this court could potentially find, was
the single use of Brown's name mentioned with a number of other
The court did not perceive this to be the type of
entertainers."
appropriation that gives rise to a right-of-publicity claim." 7
Alternatively, other courts have found that unauthorized telecast of
an entire performance on a news broadcast does constitute
108

Id.
109Id.

"Id. at 171.
799 F. Supp. at 171.
"'Brown,
12 Id.at 171-172.
13

Id.at 171.

114id.
115id.

116 Brown,799 F. Supp. at 171.
117id.
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misappropriation. u 8 Since this was not the case here, the court did
not find in favor of the plaintiff.
The court did not find that the defendant had used Brown's clips
to promote its product in any way." 9 The plaintiff s argument
may be what is wrong here, rather than the court's holding. Brown
did not argue, and was therefore unable to prove, the three points
articulated supra that a court will be looking for in a prevailing
right of publicity suit: 1) that the defendant misappropriated the
plaintiff's name or likeness for the value associated with it and not
in an incidental manner or for a newsworthy purpose; 2) the
plaintiff can be identified from the publication; and 3) the
defendant derived some advantage or benefit. 120 This test pursues
a balance between the freedom of expression on the defendant's
part and the rights of the plaintiff.
The court in Brown recognized that a carefully drafted license
agreement could cover all rights to future invented uses while
expressly reserving or transferring all rights not mentioned. This
still does not address the previously written agreements though.
Not yet used by many courts is a "practical approach" proposed by
Neil Nagano. It has three equal considerations based on fairness:
"1) who should benefit from the gain associated with the new use,
2) whether the equities weigh in favor of one party over the other,
and 3) what outcome is dictated by policies underlying the idea of
copyright protection."'' 1
The court should have used this
approach because it is a reasonable standard based on fairness, and
the pursuit of fairness is the reason for the justice system.
V. IMPACT

The impact of this court's opinion on the current state of the law
is such that courts have taken a stringent view on contractual
language. This court opined that the plaintiff really did not have a
case inarguing violations of the Copyright Act, Lanham Act and
118Id.
19
' Id. at
20

172.

1 Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 657-658.
121 Nakos, supra note 41, at 453.
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causes of action of unfair competition and violation of the right of
publicity because the language of his Agreement showed he had
conveyed these rights. To have received a more favorable
outcome, the plaintiff should have used a different argument, such
as the three points supra that need to be proven in a right of
publicity suit.
This case does not address the issue of fairness. As a result of
this court's opinion, and other courts who have followed it, there
are situations that are not addressable by the law, which involve
weighing what is fair. With the precedent Brown has set, the
impact is such that the court will now carry a very strong focus on
the contractual language while evaluating other things such as
right of publicity, persona's rights, etc. More often than not, this
will be exactly where the court needs to look in resolving
questions involving the aforementioned issues. However, what
about the situation such as Madonna's where the potential plaintiff
has signed her rights to a manager, photographer, or another over
20 years ago; before she had developed her "persona"? After
those 20 years, a right she has waived comes to haunt her. The
manager, photographer, or another uses the rights after 20 years in
a way that she does not advocate. She does not even have a
commercial exploitation claim because she has signed away her
right. Is there no recourse for such a situation? The harshness of
the court here would say "no." If a faulty contract is written,
should there be a way out? The court has made up its rules in an
effort to prevent "bad" contracts from being drafted anymore, but
when they were written so long ago and the contractual language
provides no recourse, potential plaintiffs are often just stuck with
their lot.
VI. CONCLUSION

There should be a stronger form of protection for the persona
who has waived general rights before realizing new technology.
We are now in an age where we recognize that we cannot fathom
what will be invented next. Many years ago that understanding
did not exist as it does today. This is primarily true because
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today's society has been able to watch technology develop. For
those who were unable to foresee such evolution while waiving
their interests in contractual agreements, there should be some
kind of recourse.
The courts have done a great job in addressing future technology
issues with the rights of the persona and its contractual rights. In
essence, the courts are teaching drafters of licensing agreements to
be very careful in what they write. For best protection of one's
rights, the current trend appears to be that parties write very vague
and broad contracts in order to skirt the issues brought by not yet
existing technology.1 2 2 Brown appears to be an example for future
cases in order to encourage both less vague and also less precise
contractual language when drafting agreements. The issue in
Brown was that the Agreement contained both broad and specific
language; thereby allowing the court and the defendant to interpret
the Agreement as it did. The court has done an excellent job of
working on eliminating foreseeable problems with licensing in the
area of technology and contracts. However, it still does not
address the past agreements beyond looking at contractual
language.
The court knows that while weighing the rights of the author, it
is still necessary to recognize the importance of the First
Amendment. Society needs the freedom to express as well as the
freedom, as an audience, to appreciate the author's works. At the
same time, the persona has rights and it is necessary to have a
balance between all these individual rights. The right of publicity
has not been held to outweigh the value of free speech. The
of
problem is that there are many uses addressed by the right
23
Amendment.
First
the
by
justified
arguably
publicity that are
Fairness seems to be the best approach for the courts to pursue.
The most suitable rule is that all uses not existing at the time a
license agreement is drafted should be held by the licensor unless
otherwise addressed within the agreement.12 4 Otherwise, when
M. Byrnes, supra note 31 at 282.
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The FirstAmendment: A

122 Stacey
123

Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L. 1. 47 (1994).
124
Nakos, supra note 41, at 461.
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something is not written in the contract, one's chances of
protection over a given issue is slimmer than if it is addressed.
The court should look at Nagano's fairness test or find another
test to find a reasonable standard analysis capable of ensuring the
balance of the waived rights is fair to both the persona and the
entity to whom the persona has licensed exclusive rights.
GabrielleStormo
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